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Abstract
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan officials made market-oriented
stabilization reforms to its previously Soviet-planned economy, including removing most
price constraints, privatizing various state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and taking steps to
prevent the collapse of its banking system. As part of its efforts, Kazakhstan created the
Rehabilitation Bank (RB) in 1995 to absorb the large number of non-performing assets from
state-owned banks while also assuming a corresponding amount of the institutions’
liabilities, essentially “shrinking their portfolios” (Implementation Completion Report
1998). The RB, established with a four-year mandate, either liquidated the debtors or
required the firms to restructure. Kazakhstan policymakers also created two other
institutions alongside the RB to take the non-performing assets associated with businesses
in specialized industries. Overall, loans totaling 11% of the country’s gross domestic product
were transferred to the RB and the two other asset management companies. The RB’s
collection methodology and final recovery figures are unclear. The non-performing asset
transfers did not have an immediate positive impact on the quality of Kazakhstan’s banking
system portfolio. Though the portion of the country’s loans considered non-performing fell
to a third in 1995, the figure rose to 41.3% by the end of 1996. The increase was due to better
loan classification and an underlying deterioration in loan quality. Still, some have credited
the policy with helping to prevent the banking system’s collapse.
Keywords: Kazakhstan, asset management companies, asset purchase programs,
Rehabilitation Bank, non-performing loans, non-performing assets.

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank
At a Glance
Prior to the early 1990s, the Soviet central
bank, Gosbank, allocated all financial
resources to its republics. Kazakhstan’s
financial system was historically organized
to accommodate this relationship and
remained structured this way after the
1991 dissolution of the union. In 1992, the
country’s banking system was made up of
former Gosbank domestic arm National
Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK), which became
the country’s central bank, five specialized
state banks, and more than 70 smaller
commercial banks. Gosbank previously
directed credit to the specialized banks and
required them to lend the resources to
specific firms. This credit “resembled
budget transfers” because debt payment
was not enforced (Hoelscher 1998). This
contributed to an eventual run-up in nonperforming assets.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To transfer non-performing assets from the
country’s biggest debtors to ameliorate the poor
profitability of state banks, where a majority of the
country’s deposits were held, to prevent a broader
banking system collapse (Hoelscher 1998).
Launch Dates

First transfer to RB: 1995

Wind-down Dates

Unknown

Program Size

Not specified at outset

Size and Type of NPL
Problem

Nonperforming debt equaled
55% of total portfolios in
1994 (Gürgen et al. 1999)
Largely
state-directed
commercial loans

Eligible Institutions

The country’s largest banks
Open and closed-bank

Usage

At least 11% of GDP
transferred
(Hoelscher
1998)

After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Outcomes
No data on recovery efforts
available
Kazakhstan lost its traditional revenue
sources, lacked domestic financing from Ownership Structure Government-owned
nonbank institutions, and had little access Notable Features
Involved
the
forced
restructuring or liquidation
to international capital markets. The
of the debtor firms that had
country’s economy contracted sharply,
their assets transferred to
living standards fell, and the number of
the
asset
management
insolvent businesses grew, including those
company
to which the main state banks lent. By
1994, an audit showed nonperforming debt in Kazakhstan equaled 55 percent of total
portfolios in the country (Gürgen et al. 1999).
To prevent a collapse in the banking system, the assets of which were largely concentrated
in the largest five banks, the newly independent NBK established the asset management
company (AMC) Rehabilitation Bank3 (RB) to manage firms that constituted the biggest
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Also called the “Rehabilitation Trust” in various sources.
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financial burden on the banks. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) also played a substantial role
in the RB’s establishment and operations (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
The RB forced the selected firms to restructure or liquidate and took on the businesses’ nonperforming loans to help clean up their balance sheets, along with the major banks’ (Staff
Appraisal Report 1995). The central bank considered blanket loan forgiveness but
eventually rejected the option because it worried banks would come to expect such bailouts
in the future (Hoelscher 1998). The RB took non-performing loans of 45 of the largest
insolvent debtors,4 most of which were large metallurgical and mining companies, and a
corresponding amount of liabilities, shrinking banks’ portfolios (Hoelscher 1998). “The state
in many ways relieved banks of bad loans that had been imposed by authorities”
(Implementation Completion Report 1998).
The NBK established the RB as part of a broader financial system stabilization strategy,
which included tightening entry requirements for new financial institutions and
modernizing the country’s legal and regulatory conditions. The NBK also created the
Agricultural Support Fund (ASF), which took over loans extended to nearly 4,000 insolvent
farms, and utilized the already-existing Exim Bank to acquire loans that export credit
agencies funded because of previous government guarantees (Hoelscher 1998).
The RB and the two other AMCs struggled to resolve the bad loans they absorbed. A detailed
account of the AMCs’ overarching collection methodology does not appear to be available.
The government auctioned off some of the bad loans, and later began paying joint stock
company Agency on Reorganization and Liquidation of Insolvent Enterprises to deal with
the non-performing debts (Implementation Completion Report 1998). The State Property
Committee, an entity created to privatize SOEs, also assisted in the sale of a chosen
company’s assets (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
Summary Evaluation
The Kazakhstani government struggled to adequately resolve the bad loans transferred to
its three AMCs largely because the institutions were unable to comprehensively restructure
many of the indebted businesses and farms. By 1998, the RB had provided its restructuring
and liquidation services for only 14 of the chosen firms, including liquidating five and
pushing for staff reductions in eight (Implementation Completion Report 1998).
The failure to adequately restructure some of the firms stems in part from management and
funding problems that arose. The Kazakhstani cabinet made restructuring decisions for the
largest selected firms, and the MOF held back most of the funds appropriated for the RB,
“making it difficult to make agreed payments under restructuring plans” (Republic of

Various sources give different figures for the total number of enterprises the RB handled. The author chose
Hoelscher 1998’s 45 figure because of the report’s singular focus on Kazakhstan’s restructuring program and
the time elapsed between the program’s inception and the report’s publish date.
4

292

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 2

Kazakhstan 2001). World Bank researchers argued that even if the restructuring efforts
were ineffective, the process still minimized “allocation of further resources to” the
enterprises, “contributing significantly to the health of the banking sector” (Implementation
Completion Report 1998).
Even so, the prioritization of restructuring viable businesses took scarce government
resources, slowing “the emergence of a prosperous enterprise sector” (Hoelscher 1998).
“The activities of the AMCs would have been more effective had debtors been quickly closed,
assets sold off, and the nonperforming loans quickly liquidated” (Hoelscher 1998).
Analyses conducted in 1998, four years after the asset transfers began, showed mixed
outcomes. The banking sector’s balance sheet improved, according to a World Bank review
detailing the completion of its financial support for the asset purchase program
(Implementation Completion Report 1998). Though the portion of the country’s loans
considered non-performing fell to a third in 1995, the figure rose to 41.3% by the end of
1996 (Hoelscher 1998). The rise in bad assets was partly due to improved loan classification
standards but also an actual deterioration in asset quality (Hoelscher 1998). Still, some have
argued that the NBK successfully prevented the banking system’s collapse, partially because
of “avoidance of moral hazard” and the other concurrent restructuring policies (Hoelscher
1998).
The program did not involve substantial capital injections, nor operational and institutional
restructuring of the banks that took on the bad assets to begin with, causing four of the
country’s biggest banks to undergo further financial stress, which then lead to a subsequent
bailout and “merge recapitalization” of two of the financial institutions (Tang, Zoli, and
Klytchnikova 2000). Kazakhstan’s experience “illustrates how bank restructuring without
adequate capitalization and not accompanied by operational and institutional restructuring
cannot resolve banking sector problems and may require successive government
interventions” (Tang, Zoli, and Klytchnikova 2000).
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Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank: Kazakhstan Context
GDP
$21.25 billion in 1994
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$20.37 billion in 1995
GDP per capita
$1,316 in 1994
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$1,288 in 1995
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt)
NA
Size of banking system
$3.66 billion in 1994
$2.17 billion in 1995
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
17.20% in 1994
10.64% in 1995
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
NA
system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
NA
Foreign involvement in banking system
NA
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

NA in 1994
19% in 1995

NA
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull et al.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: Kazakhstan used asset management companies to take
nonperforming loans off banks’ books, canceling the banks’ corresponding liabilities,
but did not inject government capital to ensure banks’ ability to sustain losses on
other loans.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kazakhstani government was
concerned with averting a broad banking system collapse. It focused initially on
restructuring the large state banks by dealing with the country’s sizeable stock of
nonperforming loans. It also heightened the entry requirements for new banks and
increased minimum capital requirements (Hoelscher 1998).
The NBK, tasked with running the restructuring efforts, used the RB and two specialized
AMCs to take nonperforming loans off banks’ balance sheets. It removed the banks’
corresponding liabilities to the government, essentially shrinking banks’ portfolios
(Hoelscher 1998). However, the government did not inject government capital to ensure
banks could sustain losses on other loans.
The RB took non-performing loans of 45 of the largest insolvent debtors, mostly
metallurgical and mining companies. The Agricultural Support Fund (ASF) took loans
extended to nearly 4,000 insolvent farms, and the existing Exim Bank took loans that export
credit agencies had funded under government guarantees (Hoelscher 1998).
The RB chose businesses that were the largest burdens on the country’s banks. It forced
insolvent debtors to liquidate or restructure by cutting them off from any funds outside of
the RB itself (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The RB required insolvent debtors to submit
restructuring plans that the RB board would accept or reject, the latter of which triggered
liquidation (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). But the AMC “gave priority to enterprise
rehabilitation rather than liquidation, developing comprehensive downsizing and
restructuring plans for each enterprise” (Hoelscher 1998).
2. Legal Authority: A presidential decree outlined the RB’s legal status, structure,
responsibilities, and authority.
A subsequent detailed statute would later elaborate management characteristics, according
to a World Bank report detailing the RB plan before its full implementation (Staff Appraisal
Report 1995).
3. Special Powers: Officials passed new regulations and laws to provide the RB the
necessary powers to liquidate and sell assets.
The specific nature of the new powers policymakers granted the RB is unclear.
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4. Mandate: The RB’s mandate included restructuring and liquidating firms whose
non-performing loans it took off banks’ books.
The RB prioritized restructuring, potentially because it played a role in overall privatization
and liberalization efforts, and as such, appeared to have no strictly enforced mandate to
resolve the bad debt on its books (Hoelscher 1998).
5.

Ownership: The RB was government-owned.

The NBK established the RB as an entirely state-owned joint stock bank (Staff Appraisal
Report 1995). Officials chose the central bank because the NBK’s staff was the main source
of specialized banking and finance knowledge the government could tap (Hoelscher 1998).
A World Bank report detailing the RB’s structure suggested the RB began business on the
property of one of the country’s commercial banks, accessing the institution’s
communication and computer systems as part of a “fee-based contractual arrangement”
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
6. Governance: A Supervisory Board comprised of various government ministry
leaders oversaw the RB, while NBK employees and local professionals made up the
RB’s core staff.
The RB’s Supervisory Board was chaired by a policymaker of at least “Deputy Prime Minister
rank” and included members of the economy and finance ministries, the NBK, the State
Property Committee, and outside “independent” finance and business management experts
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The board’s mandate involved approving restructuring or
liquidation plans and deciding the amount of financial support a debtor company received
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
The RB’s Management was headed by a local director with finance experience. Officials
incentivized management to reduce firms’ budgetary costs, cut losses, and keep businesses
under the RB’s watch for less than three to four years (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The
management incentivization methodology is unknown.
NBK employees staffed the RB because it was the main source of banking expertise in the
country (Hoelscher 1998). Other local professionals with experience in finance, law,
business, social security, and liquidations were to be recruited as well, with the staff
attending courses led by foreign experts and other trainings (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
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Size: The government did not set a maximum size for the program at the outset.

Non-performing loans totaling 11% of Kazakhstan’s GDP were transferred to the RB and the
other AMCs by 1998. The RB took loans equivalent to one percent of GDP, the ASF received
assets equaling four percent, and Exim took on loans of about six percent (Hoelscher 1998).
8.

Funding Source: The RB’s initial funding came from the national budget.

Any operating losses would be funded through the MOF from the state budget and by NBK
refinancing facilities and RB bonds, which were guaranteed by the government, at market
interest rates (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The World Bank also helped finance the RB’s
operations with a loan to the Kazakhstani government (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
9.

Eligible Institutions: Kazakhstan’s largest banks were the RB’s target creditors.

At the time of the program’s establishment, a weak economy and tightening monetary policy
exacerbated the nonperforming loan problem, initially brought on by state-directed lending
before Kazakhstan achieved independence. To prevent a banking system collapse, the NBK
and policymakers focused on removing bad debt that burdened the largest banks, where
most of the country’s deposits were held (Hoelscher 1998).
10. Eligible Assets: Loans to the largest nonperforming debtors in the country were
the target bad assets.
The businesses were selected chiefly by their total non-performing debt and burdens on
“creditors in terms of outstanding non-performing net liabilities to banks, enterprises, and
the state’s budget and extra-budget funds” (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). At the outset, the
World Bank stated most of the firms likely to meet the criteria would be majority stateowned (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The initial plan documents allowed the RB to take on
40 institutions, but the AMC had restructured or liquidated 45 by 1998 (Staff Appraisal
Report 1995). Most debtors were large metallurgical and mining companies.
Public service enterprises, such as utilities, were excluded because liquidation would be
unrealistic and such firms’ “financial problems stem largely from state pricing policies rather
than operating inefficiencies” (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).
11. Acquisition (Mechanics): The RB removed the nonperforming loans by also
taking on a corresponding amount of a bank’s liabilities.
This shrunk the financial institutions’ portfolios (Hoelscher 1998).
12. Acquisition (Pricing): It is unclear how RB officials priced the assets the AMC
received.
Available program documents do not contain information about the RB’s pricing
methodology.
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13. Asset Management and Disposal: The RB required chosen firms to submit
restructuring plans that the RB board would accept or reject, the latter of which
triggered liquidation. The RB’s nonperforming loan disposal methodology is unclear.
The AMC “gave priority to enterprise rehabilitation rather than liquidation, developing
comprehensive downsizing and restructuring plans for each enterprise” (Hoelscher 1998).
Privatization was generally expected as part of restructuring plans as well, if applicable.
Support from the RB remained “strictly tied to the implementation of the time-phased
restructuring plans” (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). If the plans were not implemented
completely or if they failed to make the chosen firm financially viable, the business would be
liquidated and its assets sold. In a similarly strict ethos, the possibility that a firm’s
management could be replaced in the event of even “minor shortfalls” in the restructuring
process was an “enforcement tool” available to Kazakhstani officials (Staff Appraisal Report
1995).
Most documents detailing the RB’s establishment include little to no information about the
AMC’s nonperforming loan disposal methodology, though the government appeared to
auction off some of the bad loans. Authors of a report published three years after the RB’s
establishment stated the resolution of bad loans on the AMCs’ balance sheets were of
concern to the Kazakhstani government. Rehabilitation “institutions that received the nonperforming loans were not able to make much headway in restructuring indebted farms and
enterprises” (Implementation Completion Report 1998).
The failure to adequately restructure some of the firms stems in part from management and
funding problems that arose. The Kazakhstani cabinet made restructuring decisions for the
largest selected firms, and the MOF held back most of the funds appropriated for the RB,
“making it difficult to make agreed payments under restructuring plans” (Republic of
Kazakhstan 2001).
14. Timeframe: The RB’s initial mandate was four years.
The government originally planned to close the RB, “a temporary institution,” after four
years (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). In June 1998, the RB was reorganized and renamed the
“Rehabilitation Fund.”5 With available documents, details are unknown regarding this new
organization’s structure, purpose, and funding, and if and when its operations ceased.
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